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For the time being, the 5 May 2013 Malaysian general election (GE13) has resulted in the preservation of an authoritarian regime that has existed since independence in 1957. Although the opposition won almost 51 per cent of the vote, the ruling coalition was able to defend a comfortable majority of seats in the Parliament.
Authoritarianism in Malaysia is essentially challenged by increasingly competitive elections. 1 Within political science, these regimes are often categorised as electoral authoritarian (Schedler 2006) . Electoral authoritarian systems are stable as long as the ruling party or coalition is capable of controlling the electoral process. But they are inherently unstable because voting offers opposition movements opportunities to effectively challenge regime elites.
There are indicators that Malaysia is undergoing a protracted transition from electoral authoritarianism towards electoral democracy. Opposition groups strive for "political liberalization, step by step, strategic interaction by strategic interaction, over the course of years and decades" (Eisenstadt 2000: 6) . This process started in the late 1990s. The main strategic interactions in the Malaysian case are elections and negotiations over electoral reform. In this vein, it is argued here that GE13 did effectively change politics in Malaysia.
This article raises some of the most salient issues with respect to the last general election and serves as an introduction to the five research articles in this special issue of JCSAA. It begins with a short overview of the political environment prior to GE13 and highlights electoral reforms. It then examines the election campaign, the results and their connection to ethnicity and religion. 1 I would like to thank Marco Bünte for his valuable input to this introduction.
minorities and the swelling pro-democracy movement. Thus, Najib started his tenure by announcing plans to loosen the tight grip of authoritarianism, to tone down the pro-bumiputera 2 policies and to further national unity and amity amongst ethnic and religious groups by way of his 1Malaysia campaign (Prime Minister's Office 2011). Yet, many of these high-flying initiatives turned out to be mere window dressing. The Internal Security Act (ISA), for instance, was replaced by the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA 2012) , which still allows detention without trial and incommunicado detention. The new Peaceful Assembly Act allows any form of public assembly without a permit, but requires that the police receive prior notification and prohibits street protests. Moreover, the police now have the opportunity to impose all kinds of restrictions (Brown 2013: 157) . The new Peaceful Assembly Act was used during the Bersih 3.0 rally in April 2012 when up to 300,000 demonstrators gathered in Kuala Lumpur (see below). Najib also announced that the 1948 Sedition Act would be replaced by the new National Harmony Act and promised greater freedom of expression. But the government passed amendments to the Evidence Act, which made it easier to prosecute publishers of online material. Changes to the Election Offences Act restricted the ability of party representatives to observe the polling process. Revisions to the Universities and University College Act allowed students to join political parties, but continued to bar such students from holding posts in any campus societies or running as candidates in university elections. Upon closer inspection, all of these reforms were revealed to be nothing more than a facade designed to appease both the indigenous opposition and international observers (Suaram 2013) .
The same can be said about Najib's approach towards achieving "national unity" and "racial harmony" -that is, improving relations between ethnic and religious groups. The prime minister depicted himself as a reformer with slogans such as "1Malaysia" -though realpolitik still prevailed. In front of the UN General Assembly, Najib called for a "global movement of the moderates" from all faiths to fight extremists. In April 2010, the government formed the Committee to Promote Inter-Religious Understanding and Harmony in reaction to simmering conflicts amongst religious groups. Until today, these tensions are epitomised by the dispute about using the word "Allah" in the Malay language. In early 2010, a lower court ruled to allow a Catholic newspaper to use this word for "God". This resulted in 2 The bumiputera ("sons of the soil") is composed mostly of Malays. Other, predominantly East Malaysian ethnic groups are Dayak, Melanau, Bajau, Kadazandusun, Murut, etc. Many Malaysians perceive everyday life and politics through the lense of ethnicity, although ethnic categories are to a large extent mere constructions.
fierce protests, the firebombing of 12 churches, and the stamping of more than 5,000 Malay-language bibles with "For Christians Only", which led the UMNO mouthpiece Utusan Malaysia to speculate about a Christian conspiracy. Najib and his party colleagues were caught in a dilemma: They had to defend the conservative Muslim stance on the issue, while maintaining cordial relations with the non-Muslim coalition partners. Najib was also facing pressure to introduce economic reforms without alienating his Malay supporters. The BN started the Government Transformation Programme (GTP) and announced the New Economic Model (NEM) as the foundation of the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP). The GTP aims at improving governance, uses key performance indicators to monitor the ministries, and focuses on national key result areas (NKRAs). The ETP targets an increase of gross national income (GNI) to 523 billion USD and of per capita income from 6,700 USD to a minimum of 15,000 USD by 2020. The government also had to reduce fiscal deficits, but shied away from introducing a goods and services tax. In order to develop high value added and knowledge-based industries as well as attract international investors to the Malaysian market, Najib allowed for majority share ownership of companies in 27 service subsectors without requiring participation by bumiputera equity shareholders.
With these reforms, Najib reacted to the demands by opposition parties to at least tone down affirmative action measures in favour of the bumiputera (e.g. in higher education, government employment and ownership of businesses). Those sections of the population in particular that do not benefit from these measures (i.e. the ethnic Chinese and Indians) are becoming increasingly frustrated with these policies -all the more so given that a small Malay elite (the so-called UMNOputera) avails itself of licences, concessions and cheap credits. Najib is confronted with fierce opposition within his own party and from Malay chauvinists in general. Right-wing groups such as Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa (Indigenous Empowerment Organization; Perkasa) are fighting for the perpetuation of bumiputera privileges and the concept of Malay supremacy (Ketuanan Melayu). This supremacy was emphatically defended by Najib at the UMNO party congress in 2010.
A Flawed Electoral System
According to the logic of electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia, basic political rights and civil liberties are restricted. Yet, most debates currently focus on the shortcomings of the electoral regime. Major flaws exist in connection to the delineation of constituencies (i.e. gerrymandering and malapportionment), the length of the campaign period, the large number of unexplained new voters in some constituencies, and the use of indelible ink that in reality can be washed off quite easily. There are also strong indications that the BN greatly benefits from faulty electoral rolls (Ong Kian Ming 2012a and 2012b), which are often incomplete and tampered with through multiple registrations and the registration of non-residents, amongst other things. The opposition never received a complete electoral roll and alleged that foreigners had received identity cards in exchange for votes for the BN.
It is possible, maybe even probable, that the ruling coalition would lose in fully free and fair elections. This is why the NGO alliance Bersih (the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections) and the opposition parties have focused their demands on electoral reform. In 2007, a Bersih rally attracted up to 50,000 people and stimulated opposition support for the 2008 elections. Backed by 62 NGOs, the Bersih 2.0 demonstration in July 2011 called for a clean-up of the electoral roll, an improved postal ballot system, the use of indelible ink, longer campaign periods, free and fair access to mass media for all parties, the strengthening of public institutions, and an end to corruption and dirty politics. This pressure led to the setting up of the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) on Electoral Reform in October 2011. The PSC tabled its report in April 2012, and the Election Commission agreed to implement 7 of the 10 proposals, including the use of indelible ink and the clean-up of electoral rolls. According to Bersih 2.0, the PSC report did not adequately address key issues such as the manipulation of the electoral roll and citizenship-for-votes deals. Furthermore, no implementation time frames were specified for the majority of the recommendations (Brown 2013: 149) . A "minority report" of opposition members of the PSC was not accepted by the Speaker of Parliament. The botched reforms brought about a new movement. In April 2012, the Bersih 3.0 rally in Kuala Lumpur, this time backed by 84 NGOs, reiterated most of the previous demands, attracting up to 300,000 protesters according to the organisers' estimates.
Although the establishment of the PSC and the introduction of some reforms may be seen as a success, the conduct of the 2013 elections made clear that major flaws still persist (see for instance: Pemantau Pilihan Raya Rakyat 2013).
The opinion research firm Merdeka Center stated that the 372,000 advance or postal votes could have been essential to the BN's victory in 22 parliamentary constituencies in May 2013 (The Malaysian Insider 2013a). Often, votes were cast in police stations without opposition monitors, and almost 89.5 per cent of them went to the BN.
Another problem is eligible voters who reside overseas. Only about 6,000 out of 700,000 Malaysians living outside the country are registered as overseas voters. The number was low because the decision to allow postal votes at embassies only came into effect in January 2013. In their article, James Gomez and Rusdi Omar (in this issue) use Singapore as a case study to illustrate the complexity of this matter. As a neighbouring country, it is exempt from postal voting; however, this in itself caused a variety of new problems. Almost every second Malaysian living abroad resides in Singapore. At the time of the next general election, around half a million Malaysiansmost of them with Chinese roots -are expected to reside in the city-state. Election campaigning is illegal in Singapore, where demonstrations by Malaysians after GE13 even led to some arrests. Voting became a transnational activity because Malaysians had to travel back to their country to cast their ballots.
Money and Media
Another constant complaint is directed towards the lack of effective regulations on the financing of candidates and political parties (see: Transparency International Malaysia 2011). 3 Malaysia does not have bans or limits on anonymous, foreign or corporate donations. Political parties can spend as much money as they want and they do not have to report these expenses. Political finance, thus, is almost unregulated. The exception is the campaign spending limits for candidates, who are allowed to spend no more than 200,000 MYR in parliamentary elections or 100,000 MYR in state assembly elections. Despite this, candidates' financial reports are not effectively audited, and many of them -especially from the BN -spend much more. Party expenses are not accounted for, and the BN parties have a major advantage because they have their own corporate enterprises, have access to public money, and are connected to crony entrepreneurs (Gomez 2012) . Ahead of the 2013 elections, it was revealed that a Sabah businessman had smuggled 40 million MYR in from Hong Kong in order to contribute to the Sabah UMNO; yet the government did not see any breach of existing laws (Transparency International Malaysia 2012). The Malaysian Election Commission does not effectively deal with complaints about the above-mentioned manipulations or "money politics", because it falls under the control of the Prime Minister's Department.
The BN component parties do not only have an enormous amount of material resources at their disposal, they also hold sway in all major television and newspaper enterprises. UMNO controls, for example, Utusan Malaysia, the MCA owns The Star, and the Indian newspapers are closely linked to the MIC. The opposition parties have their own newspapers such as The Rocket (DAP) and Harakah (PAS), but circulation is very limited due to various restrictions. Most television and radio stations are lopsided in their news coverage. In a media monitoring project conducted during the polls, the Centre for Independent Journalism (CIJ) and the Malaysia Campus of the University of Nottingham clearly demonstrated this partial reporting (Houghton 2013) .
In Malaysia, an estimated 13 million people use Facebook and 2 million Twitter. Young voters in particular get their news to a large degree online. In contrast to 2008, the government was well aware of the importance of social media to its campaign in 2013. It thus created a special division under which pro-BN bloggers were trained. According to Chin (2013: 2) , they organised workshops to train up to 10,000 "BN cybertroopers". Another unit within the Department of Special Affairs also instructed bloggers to support UMNO and BN on the Internet.
Ross Tapsell (in this issue) shows that cyberspace has been increasingly penetrated by political parties, especially by UMNO. During GE13, a "cyber war" between political parties and rival paid and unpaid supporters was waged. Tapsell details how UMNO mobilised its cybertroopers against the so-called Red Bean Army, supposedly established by the DAP.
Although the Internet clearly contributes to a diversity of viewpoints, it would be premature to suggest that it per se undermines authoritarianism. Nonetheless, Tapsell points out that online media has had a side-effect that is often overlooked: it has started to transform traditional media outlets, such as Sinar Harian, Oriental Daily, The Edge, The Malay Mail, Astro Awani (television station), BFM (radio station) which are striving to become (more) non-partisan in order to attract bigger audiences.
The Election Campaign
In May 2013, some 13.3 million voters decided on the composition of the new Dewan Rakyat and the state assemblies, with the exception of Sarawak. Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected through a plurality vote in 222 single-member constituencies for a maximum term of five years.
This time round, the government postponed the polls on several occasions -presumably due to the opposition's strength and uncertainty with respect to the ballot outcome. In 2012, observers had speculated for months when Najib, the longest-serving prime minister without a personal mandate, would decide on the dissolution of Parliament. Although Najib did well in opinion polls, he was well aware that the Pakatan Rakyat would at least endanger BN's two-thirds majority in Parliament and could even topple him.
When the campaign eventually started, its major themes centred on good governance, corruption, and bumiputera privileges. The BN pointed to the economic progress the country had enjoyed under its regime, while UMNO presented itself as the protector of Malay "special rights" and Muslim interests against supposedly inexperienced contestants. Yet, the opposition was much more unified than ever before. Moreover, the Pakatan Rakyat had received considerable support in the 2011 Sarawak state elections and thought it would profit from the "Allah issue" in East Malaysia, where the majority of Christians are very sensitive to outside interference in religious affairs. Moreover, the coalition stressed its good governance record in Penang and Selangor, where it has ruled since 2008, and underlined the importance of clean elections and a corruption-free administration. It called for an end to the bumiputera privileges, criticised abuses of power and corruption, and promised to lower the cost of living and respect minority rights. 4 The BN spent tremendous amounts of money to please would-be voters. The Bantuan Rakyat 1 Malaysia (BR1M; 1Malaysia People's Aid) programme provided households with an income under 3,000 MYR per month with a one-off payment of 500 MYR. The 1Malaysia initiative also granted free basic medical services, Internet centres for the urban poor, and subsidies for general stores (Kedai Rakyat 1Malaysia). In addition, 586 million MYR was allocated to the Price Uniformity Scheme, which was designed to bring equally priced basic items to the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. In addition, the BN promoted teachers; gave civil servants an additional allowance of 500 MYR; reduced toll rates; subsidised rice, flour, sugar, fuel, and energy; and approved a schooling aid of 100 MYR per pupil as well as a book voucher scheme of 250 MYR per person for form six students and undergraduates (Case 2013: 140; Barisan Nasional 2013) . All of these programmes were perceived by many voters to be an explicit part of the BN electoral campaign headed by Najib. According to Welsh (2013) , a new style of "money politics" came into being in 2013. Najib "adopted a new pattern of distributing benefits to the population, using government coffers in an unprecedented way" (Welsh 2013: 141) . Before, political parties were the main vehicles for patronage -namely, the BN. This form of developmentalism, "promises of better services and targeted government-funded infra- structure-development projects in exchange for votes" (ibid.), had started in the 1990s, but was radicalised by Najib who spent around 20 billion USDmanaged by his PM office -between April 2009 and May 2013. The professionalisation of campaigning was conducted by highly paid consultants and focused on advertising (Welsh 2013: 143 The opposition parties won 89 out of 222 parliamentary mandates at the national level and 229 out of 505 seats at the state level. With 38 seats, the DAP has a very strong position within the Chinese community. The PKR, with 30 MPs, is more multi-ethnic in outlook and composition than the other big parties in the country -though it is still perceived to predominantly represent Malays. Within PAS (21 MPs), there is an element that has questioned the utility of being a member of Pakatan Rakyat; the party's pragmatists, however, are quick to point out that a powerful presence outside the "Malay heartland" in the Northern states is only guaranteed within the coalition.
Pakatan Rakyat only gained majorities in three state parliaments this time, but these are of great strategic importance. Kelantan has been the major bastion of PAS since the late 1950s, whereas Selangor and Penang are large-scale industrial centres that are economically very strong and enjoy high rates of indigenous and foreign investment. Whereas Pakatan Rakyat is a coalition with three partners of equal weight, the BN has now become more dominated than ever before by UMNO, which claimed 88 seats; this is because the West Malaysian coalition partners that represent Chinese and Indian voters now have very small parliamentary factions. The two Chinese parties, MCA and Gerakan, have only seven seats and one seat, respectively; the MIC has four. In contrast, East Malaysian BN component parties such as PBB (14 seats) and Parti Rakyat Sarawak (PRS; 6 seats) are crucial for the coalition. Sabah and Sarawak are seen as "safe deposits" by the BN, but representatives from the two states are generally overlooked when policies are decided upon in Kuala Lumpur.
Drawing on extensive ethnographic fieldwork, Meredith Weiss demonstrates that GE13 has further consolidated a party system characterised by two opposing coalitions with strongly institutionalised parties. Whereas Weiss and others thought that party institutionalisation within an authoritarian system only perpetuates BN rule, it is now ever more conceivable that access to formal politics is broadened because the Pakatan Rakyat has entrenched itself in the polity. Moreover, political and civil society are mutually constitutive, and political parties absorb and represent societal interests.
Weiss stresses the role of "machinery" in the elections and vividly illustrates the connection of candidates to canvassers, volunteers, and organisations "on the ground". Whereas the BN component parties usually make use of old-established networks, Pakatan Rakyat parties appear to have caught up to a large extent -though they do not have the money to build extensive clientelist ties.
The Role of Ethnicity and Religion
UMNO's Chinese coalition partners were decisively weakened by the 2013 elections. The BN received only 24.4 per cent of the Chinese vote, which is about 20 percentage points less than in 2008. Immediately after the polls, the MCA announced its intention not to take over any ministry. Gerakan, the other preponderantly Chinese party within the BN and for a long time the ruling party in Penang, has been insignificant since 2008 and even more so since the 2013 elections.
The BN also tried to improve its image amongst Indian voters, who had overwhelmingly supported the ruling coalition for decades before many of them surprisingly switched their allegiance to the opposition in 2008. One of the reasons for this had been the establishment of the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf), which raised a new political awareness amongst Indians. In order to reverse this trend, Najib successfully signed a memorandum with Hindraf before the 2013 polls and promised various measures to accommodate Indian grievances. Nevertheless, the BN gained only 45.1 per cent of the Indian vote (compared to 51.1 per cent in 2008), suffering losses in urban areas such as Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, and Johor (The Malaysian Insider 2013d).
All this indicates that ethnicity and religion are mirrored in the election results; although, predicated on the existing data, it is impossible to disen- Yet, the BN failed to attract non-Malay voters despite intensive campaigning. In this vein, Farish Noor (in this issue) asks whether Najib's 1Malaysia project was a genuine attempt at secular-inclusive nation-building. It was exceptional because it was a narrative void of "religious communitarianism". Yet, the opening-up of the economy and the growing pressure on bumiputera effected a backlash by chauvinists within the Malay community. At the same time, reformers within PAS were strengthened because the party's decades-long competition with UMNO for the "better Islam" slowed down. The so-called Erdogan faction of progressives within PAS was able to promote the concept of an Islamic Welfare State that stood in contrast to the aspirations propagated by the ulama or conservative faction to fundamentally transform society with notions of establishing an Islamic State. Despite Najib's efforts, Chinese support for the BN parties was extremely low due to unresolved religious and inter-ethnic issues as well as Najib's tolerance of Perkasa and like-minded groups.
In her contribution, Kikue Hamayotsu observes ethnic and religious tensions that have been growing since 2007 and illustrates this with the "Allah issue", conflicts surrounding cases of apostasy or conversion, the rise of Perkasa, and Mahathir's renewed support for the chauvinistic and the sometimes controversial stances of Jabatan Kemajuan Agama Islam (JAKIM; Department of Islamic Development Malaysia) officials. This Islamisation and ethnicisation of the political discourse is the result of the Malay-Muslim elite's perception of a threat posed by a strengthened multi-ethnic opposition alliance that is cooperating with a more assertive civil society. Hamayotsu identifies more confident non-Malay and non-Muslim communities, which she claims is exemplified by the emergence of Hindraf in 2007 and the anti-regime movement dominated by non-Malays.
Strangely, whereas civil society groups have politicised communalism, political parties have been more constrained. Prior to and during GE13, Pakatan Rakyat avoided discussing ethnic and religious issues, and Najib highlighted his 1Malaysia concept. This reveals a divide between those seek-ing office via elections, on the one hand, and state religious officials and secular civil servants who have not heeded minority interests, on the other.
Because of the Chinese support for the Pakatan Rakyat, Najib started to complain about a "Chinese tsunami" following the 2013 elections. Utusan Malaysia -infamous for using racist undertones and vehemently defending a Malay supremacy in its biased news coverage -ran a headline titled "Apa lagi orang Cina mahu?" ("What else do the Chinese want?") and incited intense indignation, particularly amongst members of ethnic minority groups. This was all the more deplorable since ethnic cleavages are in reality often merely at the surface of much deeper divides -namely, those between social classes. This is, for instance, suggested by differences in voter behaviour that were the result of obvious rural-urban gap and differences between diverse income and professional groups.
Concluding Remarks
Was GE13 business as usual? The articles in this issue show that the form of campaigning differed from previous elections. Whereas the ruling coalition has strengthened its presence on the Internet, traditional media are opening up to a certain extent. At the same time, the 2013 contest was more presidentialised and probably more commercialised than ever before. Moreover, the "1Malaysia" theme seems to have had an impact despite not thoroughly convincing most members of ethnic and religious minorities. Also, religion as a campaign issue was less pronounced than before.
Yet, Najib's reform drive was half-hearted at best. The reforms were not met with widespread approval by the electorate, probably because they were largely ineffectual und untrustworthy. These reform programmes were essentially buried in September 2013 when the prime minister, ahead of the UMNO party elections, announced measures offering more business and training opportunities and affordable housing to the bumiputera under the Bumiputera Economic Empowerment Plan (BEEP). It is still open to debate whether religious and ethnic conflicts are going to rise. Obviously, ultra-nationalistic and Islamist pressures, especially those from outside the party system, have not subsided. In any case, recent PAS elections in November 2013 evinced a consolidation of the so-called Erdogan faction of professionals, which has buttressed their pragmatic approach against ulama orthodoxy and the conservatism abhorred by religious minorities in particular. This has also confirmed the trend of a stabilisation of a party system characterised by two major coalitions.
GE13 corroborated the idea of a transition to some form of electoral democracy. For the first time in Malaysian history, the opposition got more votes than the ruling coalition. Malaysia could be an example of an electoral authoritarian regime that evolves in a protracted transition into a democracy via a series of elections (Ufen 2009 ). Since 1999, the opposition has slowlyalthough with some setbacks -gained in strength, resulting in the consolidation of a party system with two strong coalitions. The Pakatan Presidential Council meets regularly, tensions between DAP and PAS have been reduced, and cooperation during elections between coalition members is improving. Moreover, the coalition is now better represented in East Malaysia where they have taken over the role of indigenous opposition parties. Pakatan Rakyat is now socially well rooted and maintains close connections to a growing civil society movement. Tellingly, this movement focuses on electoral reforms, because even small corrections of the existing flawed regulatory framework could shake up the whole political system. PD Dr. Andreas Ufen is a senior research fellow at GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, Hamburg, Germany. His research focuses on democratisation, Islamisation, political finance and political parties in Southeast Asia. E-mail: <andreas.ufen@giga-hamburg.de>
